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FINANCIAL HARM AND VICTIMISATION 
In the past thirty years, consumers of financial services firms have been victims of three 
major waves of offences in the United Kingdom.  
First, the gradual withdrawal of the Conservative government from pension provision, 
coupled with deregulation of the retail financial services sector in the latter half of the 
1980s, created the conditions for a wave of pensions mis-selling. Companies launched into a 
hard sell, wrongly advising many clients to cash in their existing pensions contributions and 
transfer them to new, private schemes about which they received false information. One 
survey conducted by the Securities and Investments Board found that only 9% of pensions 
companies had complied with legal requirements when originally advising on these 
pensions’ transfers. Meanwhile, although breaches had been first uncovered in 1990, a 
KPMG survey of pensions advice given during 1991-1993, revealed that in ‘four out of five 
cases’ pensions companies were still giving advice short of legal standards. (Slapper and 
Tombs, 1999, p 63). Early in 1998, the-then new regulatory body, the Financial Services 
Authority (since 2012, the Financial Conduct Authority ), estimated the final costs of mis-
selling as around £11billion, with some 2.4 million victims.   
At the end of the 1990s, evidence of widespread mis-selling of endowment mortgages also 
begun to emerge. Following the end of state house-building and government 
encouragement to buy their homes, millions of such policies had been sold through the 
1980s and 1990s based on the claim that on maturity of the endowment policy, the sum 
returned to an investor would pay off the costs of their homes, a claim which often proved 
to be false. About five million people were victimised (Fooks, 2003). The saga is uncannily 
similar to that of pensions mis-selling. First, the list of companies involved in each is very 
similar. Second, the endowment mortgage scandal was characterised by long term obduracy 
on the part of companies in the sector initially to admit any wrongdoing, then subsequently 
to compensate victims.  
A virtually identical sequencing of events then unfolded with respect to Personal Payment 
Protection Insurance (PPPI). PPPI policies were widely marketed and sold at the start of this 
century, at the height of the credit boom. Financial services firms targeted customers with 
debts such as mortgages, credit cards or loans insurance against any  future inability  to 
meet repayments. But again, these products were often sold when unnecessary, or without 
customers’ knowledge, or indeed were to prove invalid in the event of customers claiming 
against them. In 2005, the Citizens Advice Bureau filed a ‘super-complaint’ relating to PPPI 
mis-selling to the Office of Fair Trading.  Yet this did not stop companies continuing to 
engage in a business they knew to be illegal: some 16 million PPPI policies have been sold 
since 2005. Moreover, the companies embroiled in the mis-selling of PPPI included many of 
the, by now, ‘usual suspects’ involved in the previous ‘crime and harm’ waves. 
These will not be the last ‘scandals’ associated with the retail financial services sector and its 
direct targeting of individual consumers – quite apart from the wider allegations of crime 
and harm such as those associated with the fixing of LIBOR and FOREX,  sanctions-busting, 
money laundering, cartelisation, and insider trading. In combination, such phenomena are 
likely to generate greater media and popular, if not political and regulatory, scrutiny of the 
sector; and this, in turn, will bring to light further categories of mis-selling.  
Any further such harms will involve more or less the same companies. They will affect 
millions of people in ways that are diffuse. And they will exacerbate now well-established 
processes of victimisation and social harms, which have had many dimensions. 
First, these products and their markets were regulated – albeit not adequately – but state 
expenditures were consumed in the various stages of this regulatory process, expenditures 
sourced by general taxation. Second, while millions of individuals did receive compensation, 
this cannot take account of any emotional or psychological costs that they or their families 
may have incurred in this process, not least where claims for compensation across each 
form of mis-selling were, routinely and falsely, denied and denied again. Third, new market 
opportunities for business have emerged around these waves of mis-selling, markets in  
‘claims management’, where private companies pursue claims on behalf of individuals – on 
the basis of a percentage of the settlement; thus, private profits were created out of 
victims’ compensation. Fourth, the costs incurred by financial services companies in 
compensation must be offset elsewhere, through raising charges for other products – so the 
costs of offending are dispersed to existing and future customers (Tombs, 2015). 
Perhaps most significantly of all, taking these waves and layers of harms together, a 
combined effect of them may be to generate popular anger, anxiety, or apathy. The routine 
and seemingly endless production of harms may inure people to their malevolence, as the 
population becomes anaesthetised to such harm.  Thus, perhaps the most pernicious effect 
is that harm and crime become virtually normalised, part of what ‘banks’ do, seemingly 
inevitable and unstoppable – and destroying social trust in banking, a basic and a necessary 
social function.   
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